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The skepticism of Sextus Empiricus is different in spirit from the skepti-
cism of today. Skepticism is important today for epistemologists, but one can 
perhaps be forgiven for thinking it mainly an academic exercise. In contrast, 
Sextus’ skepticism, Pyrrhonism, was, like most ancient philosophy, a route to 
happiness. As he explains in Outlines of Pyrrhonism (henceforth PH from its Greek 
title), the Pyrrhonist sought happiness and tranquility by finding the answers 
to his most troubling questions. Having tried as hard as he could, he still found 
himself at an impasse: there seemed to be equally good reasons to accept each 
side of the debates. Being unable to determine the right answer, he suspended 
his judgment though he continued searching. Upon suspending his judgment, 
he found that the tranquility he had sought was effortlessly his. He no longer 
worried about the truth of the matter, but was content being led by appear-
ances. In particular, he no longer regarded any state as good or bad in itself. 
Therefore, he was less concerned with his worldly situation. Indeed, he is like 
the painter Apelles who was painting a horse and wanted to represent the froth 
on its mouth. Though he tried, he could not paint it. He was so upset with him-
self that he threw his sponge at the painting. To his wonder, the smudge where 
the sponge had hit exactly captured the look of the froth. So too, the Pyrrhonist 
finds what he seeks exactly when he thinks he cannot resolve his vexing ques-
tions (PH, 1. 28-29).
In order to suspend her judgment, the Pyrrhonist must establish modes 
and arguments, equally representing different positions in a debate. She brings 
about in herself a special skeptical skill opposing the arguments of dogmatists 
with other equally strong arguments. Importantly, she is not attempting to con-
clusively refute the dogmatist, but, having heard good arguments for both sides, 
she seeks suspension of judgment and tranquility. At this point, one may ask 
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whether the Pyrrhonist is as she claims she is. Skeptikos in Greek means some-
thing like the English term: ‘searching,’ but it seems that the Pyrrhonist is not 
much interested in searching for the truth; she thinks she knows the way to 
tranquility and opposes arguments to that purpose.
None of this background is explained in Against the Logicians (L), so much 
of the main point of the argumentation would be lost on a reader unfamiliar 
with Pyrrhonism. With the above explanation, though, and the fine introduc-
tion from Richard Bett, much of Sextus’ purpose should be quite plain. L serves 
as part of a larger work called Against the Mathematicians that is Sextus’ detailed 
opposition to the arguments in most of the major sciences of his day (we do not 
know exactly when his day was, but the safest conjecture is that he flourished in 
the 2nd century AD). L deals with, obviously, the part that was then called logic, 
one of the three major parts of philosophy. We would now class much of their 
logic as epistemology and philosophy of language, along with what would now 
be formal logic proper. Logicians deals mainly with the epistemological ques-
tions, with the others being dealt with elsewhere in Mathematicians.
L begins with a historical exegesis of previous positions on the criterion of 
truth, mainly from a couple of centuries before its time. The criterion of truth 
is that standard by which we judge propositions and beliefs for their truth. This 
is amongst the best source material we have on ancient epistemology and it 
is worth reading the book just for it. Sextus provides short essays on various 
Greek philosophers and their epistemologies, for example, Xenophanes, Pro-
tagoras, Plato, Carneades, and Epicurus. Many of these philosophers’ views are, 
as is well known, quite charming. There is also a historical discussion of what a 
human is at L 1. 263-282.
The body of the text is taken up with discussion of the criterion, truth, 
sign, and demonstration. A sign is an apparent thing which is indicative “sim-
ply by means of its own nature and constitution” of a non-apparent thing. For 
example, the nature of the soul is not apparent, but the body, being apparent, 
is claimed by some to be a sign of the nature of the soul (L, 2. 154-155). A 
demonstration is like an argumentative sign that carries apparent premises to 
non-apparent conclusions by a valid form.
Most of Sextus’ analysis is epistemological: he asks questions about how we 
can know that a thing is of a certain type or exists at all. He also raises meta-
physical issues, such as the nature of truth, and logical issues, such as the nature 
of the conditional or negation. His arguments are often of a small number of 
forms. For example, the argument as follows is exceedingly common: some 
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dogmatist says x with or without a criterion. If he says it without a criterion, he 
will have nothing to say against an opponent who asserts the opposite. If he says 
it with a criterion, then he will need to show that this criterion is a criterion. 
Of course, Sextus has already spent many pages arguing that criteria are impos-
sible, and so the dogmatist is caught.
As is often said, many of Sextus’ arguments are terrible or downright 
strange by our standards. For example, at L 1. 412-3 he discusses whether sight 
recognizes the truth of anything. He says that if it recognizes anything, it will 
recognize the color of a human being. However, it does not recognize the color 
of a human being because that color changes according to seasons, age, diseases 
etc, so sight does not recognize the truth of anything. It is easy to see the pecu-
liarity of this argument.
However, Sextus should cause an incredible amount of concern for dogma-
tists both of his day and of today. An argument like the following is as powerful 
today as it was two millennia ago. How are we to establish that things appear 
as they actually are? Well, we must either use something apparent to everyone 
or not. Surely, we cannot use something not apparent to everyone, for that is 
trying to prove something more obvious by something less obvious. However, 
neither can we use something apparent to everyone, because that is exactly 
what is being questioned and what is being questioned cannot confirm itself. 
Thus, we cannot establish the truth of appearances (L, 2. 357-9). These kinds of 
deep epistemological questions are prevalent in Logicians and ought still to vex 
dogmatists everywhere.
Sextus is not (as a superficial reading may indicate) trying to establish that 
there is no criterion or sign. This epistemological nihilism is just the same as 
any other kind of dogmatism to Sextus. Rather, he places the arguments of the 
positive and negative dogmatists opposite each other to balance them and bring 
about suspension of judgment and tranquility in himself. Thus, he is not open 
to the same self-refutation charge to which the negative dogmatist is open. This 
crucial point is mentioned only a couple of times in Logicians, but is dealt with 
more substantially in PH. If a reader misses this point, the substance of Sextus’ 
argument will be lost on her.
Further, to bring about this balance of arguments, Sextus often supposes 
dogmatic premises, especially principles of reasoning, in order to show that the 
dogmatists themselves must admit that their doctrines are faulty. It should not 
be thought that Sextus takes these premises to be true; rather, like a fire that 
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destroys itself after destroying the wood, his suppositions are abandoned after 
they have done their work against the dogmatists (L, 2. 480).
Sextus was not very influential in ancient times, and we only find one suc-
cessor of him mentioned, a Saturnius. This is not the case, though, with modern 
philosophy. Indeed, Richard Popkin has suggested that the rediscovery of Sextus 
was one of the main determinants of the course of modern philosophy. Indeed, 
in Logicians we have an appearance of the famous dream argument directed 
here against the Stoics (I. 403), as well as an argument that looks quite like a 
postmodern claim about never being able to escape one’s subjectivity (1. 425). 
Thus, Sextus, the only representative of the Pyrrhonists still extant, should be 
of great interest to historians of modern as well as ancient philosophy.
However, it seems much more sensible for a student to begin reading Sex-
tus with PH, especially book 1. This is a much more elegantly written work, 
with a clear structure and a more comprehensive outlook. L, on the other hand, 
is often detailed and sometimes tedious in its repetitive arguments. Of course, 
detail is gold to the aficionado, but will certainly be an unwelcome obstacle to 
the general reader. PH does not include the historical survey, but this should be 
of little consequence to the reader interested in learning of Pyrrhonism itself.
Bett’s translation is fluent. He is clearly more philosophically sensitive 
than Bury, translator of the only other English edition, and Bett’s volume is 
clearly to be preferred. He writes it especially for readers with no Greek, and 
even transliterates each Greek word mentioned. This is annoying for the Greek 
reader but, no doubt, more welcoming for a general reader. The notes are thor-
ough, though not extensive, containing explanation of the translation, cross-
references, and a little philosophical help. The introduction is also very good 
for the philosophical and biographical context. Bett’s structuring is especially 
to be praised, with his detailed outline and section titles very helpful for read-
ers attempting to comprehend Sextus’s most tedious arguments. This is a well-
executed book designed and suitable for the lover of Sextus, whatever one’s 
language abilities.
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Although Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow claim that “the ulti-
mate question of life, the universe, and everything” (Hawking and Mlodinow, 
2010, 10) is traditionally philosophical, they nevertheless declare that philoso-
phy is “dead” and that “the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge” is 
today carried by scientists (5). However, despite rejecting philosophy, Hawking 
and Mlodinow inevitably employ philosophical argumentation in expounding 
their Grand Design (though, for or the most part, they employ it badly) and they 
are apparently unaware of the debt they owe to philosophy and the way that it 
could have contributed to their project. 
Hawking publishes not only for the scientific community but for gener-
al readers as well (A Brief History of Time, 1988). His latest book, coauthored 
with Leonard Mlodinow, is intended for a non-technical audience. The authors 
avoid using mathematical equations, relying instead on analogies and graphic 
illustrations to advance understanding. Notwithstanding their conversational 
approach, Grand Design contains serious philosophical flaws that diminish the 
authors’ persuasiveness. 
For example, they state at the outset that their approach to questions of “ev-
erything” is based on what they call “model-dependant realism”. They explain 
that this is “the idea that a physical theory or world picture is a model (generally 
of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the 
model to observations” (43). Hawking and Mlodinow seem unaware of the fact 
that their position is fundamentally philosophical as it is beyond the scope of 
observation and empirical testing. They declare “it is pointless to ask whether 
a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation” (46). Nevertheless, 
this is mere deflection and does not address the more fundamental question 
of what actually exists. Unfortunately, Hawking and Mlodinow do not realize 
that they are making philosophical assertions while simultaneously proclaiming 
philosophy dead. 
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Hawking and Mlodinow accuse Aristotle of suppressing “facts he found un-
appealing” (24), but they themselves are guilty of this when they revisit Samuel 
Johnson’s refutation of George Berkeley’s immaterialism. Johnson’s argument, 
they claim did not actually refute Berkeley, but rather lent support to David 
Hume who claims “although we have no rational grounds for believing in an 
objective reality, we also have no choice but to act as if it is true” (45). 
Hawking and Mlodinow fail to point out that Hume’s principal philosoph-
ic project was to critique efficient causality, not objective reality. Hume would 
claim that there is no reason to expect the stone to roll away from Johnson’s 
boot because any perceived causality is simply an imposition of our minds and 
the reason we see the boot as affecting the stone is that we are accustomed to 
seeing this happen via constant conjunction. Hume’s epistemology, however, is 
radically empiricist. For, if objective reality did not exist, there would be noth-
ing for us to sense, leaving us with no knowledge (a claim Hume did not make 
because it would have devastated his epistemology). Hawking and Mlodinow 
simply disregard the scientific difficulties engendered by Hume’s empiricism. 
For example, besides what we perceive from constant conjunction, there is no 
reason to believe in the causality of gravity. Yet, Hawking and Mlodinow employ 
philosophy to support their positions.
The authors also fault the ancient Greeks for developing theories without 
“the goal of experimental verification” (22), but again, they themselves seem 
to commit this error when they adopt scientific determinism. They claim that 
scientific determinism implies that “there are no miracles, or exceptions to the 
laws of nature” (34). However, in order for Hawking and Mlodinow to claim 
that there are no exceptions to a law, they must have tested and observed all 
occurrences of the law (i.e., something beyond the scope of scientific obser-
vation). Indeed, even though the authors state that “not all generalizations we 
observe can be thought of as laws of nature” (28), they still maintain that the 
“laws” they are discussing really are unbreakable and inviolate. 
One of the major claims in The Grand Design is that “it is not necessary to 
invoke God” as the creator of the universe to explain our existence because the 
laws of nature enables nature to “create itself from nothing” (180). Hawking 
and Mlodinow posit that any “uncaused cause” of the universe is unnecessary in 
explaining the existence of the universe because of the inevitability of the uni-
verse’s own laws. In essence, the authors have simply transformed the laws of 
nature into uncaused causes. Avoiding philosophical terminology does not change 
the philosophical essence of a position. Even while Hawking and Mlodinow deny 
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it, they again find themselves relying on philosophy to explain and defend their 
positions. 
To answer the “question of everything,” Hawking and Mlodinow offer “M-
Theory” as a “fundamental theory of physics that is a candidate for the theory 
of everything” (185). The authors claim that M-Theory is “the only candidate 
for a complete theory of a universe” (181). One may wonder how the authors 
are justified in claiming that the above statement is scientific. Just because at 
present, there is only one theory does not mean that it is the right theory. That 
would be tantamount to saying at trial that ‘there is only one defendant in the 
courtroom so he must be guilty.’ Nevertheless Hawking and Mlodinow boldly 
decree that “M-Theory is the unified theory Einstein was hoping to find” (181), 
ignoring the fact that they have failed to show the connections between their 
premises and conclusions.
In my view, the major flaw of The Grand Design is the idea put forth by 
Hawking and Mlodinow that philosophy is dead and science is its successor. 
Though the matters investigated by philosophy and science may overlap, this 
does not mean that one can take over the role of the other. While the authors 
claim “[p]hilosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, par-
ticularly physics” (5), they fail to explain how this accounts for philosophy’s 
demise.
Hawking and Mlodinow need to remember the maxim: quod gratis asseri-
tur, quod gratis negatur (what is freely asserted may be freely denied). The au-
thors’ casual dismissal of philosophy is a serious error. Hawking and Mlodinow 
mention numerous philosophers in their work that lends it a certain cache, but 
merely mentioning philosophers does not show that these physicists really un-
derstand their positions anymore than a philosopher’s mentioning of Newton, 
Faraday, or Einstein evinces an understanding of physics.
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Introduction
Miira Tuominen earned her PhD at the University of Helsinki in 2002, 
where she is currently based, and for a time she worked as a visiting scholar at 
the University of Chicago, and as a lecturer in philosophy at the University of 
Jyväskylä, Finland. Her monograph, Apprehension and Argument: Ancient Theories 
of Starting Points for Knowledge, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 3 
(Dordrecht, 2007) is based on her doctoral thesis. It discusses how the ancient 
philosophers understood the starting points (archai) of knowledge. Both Appre-
hension and Argument and the book under review here, The Ancient Commentators, 
display Tuominen’s love of teaching and genuine interest in providing clearly 
written, informative works of secondary literature for the use of students and 
young academics. Works of that nature are sorely needed and Tuominen’s books 
definitely fill a gap. Moreover, her books are of interest not only to philosophers 
but also to classicists, Arabists, and medievalists as well as practicioners work-
ing in related fields. Her clarity of style and commitment to her subject will be 
appreciated across disciplines.
Place in Current Scholarship
Tuominen’s title is one of nine in the series Ancient Philosophies published 
by the University of California Press. Tuominen’s topic is, in my view, daring, 
subtle and challenging. She has done a superb job in rising to the intellectual 
and pedagogical challenges set in front of her and in meeting the brief of her 
publisher to offer ‘a clear yet rigorous presentation of core ideas’.
The Ancient Commentators builds on the work of M.R. James, Robert Todd, 
George Karamanolis, and Anne Sheppard, amongst others, and stops at the 
point where the edited volume of Katerina Ierodiakonou on Byzantine philoso-
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phy picks up. The decision of Tuominen to exclude the Byzantine philosophers 
had to be taken on the grounds of limitation of space and the introductory 
nature of her project. A treatment of the more advanced and difficult aspects of 
philosophical reception may be forthcoming by this very talented scholar. 
The reason why, in the book, there is a greater emphasis on the reception 
of Aristotle rather than Plato is the same, too. Tuominen’s writing reflects both 
her research instincts and teaching practice. She explains in her book that in An-
tiquity Aristotle was taught first, in order to introduce students to the discipline 
of philosophy and the more difficult Plato was reserved for more advanced 
studies. Even within the Platonic corpus, certain dialogues were regarded as 
more advanced than others were, with Timaeus and Parmenides occupying the 
higher end of the scale. Tuominen follows this pattern in her own teaching and 
her textbook on the ancient commentators mirrors these trends. Therefore 
important works like, for example, Proclus’s commentary on Parmenides are 
excluded from her treatment because of the volume of knowledge that a discus-
sion of them presupposes. In this respect, too, it is hoped that the author will 
oblige with further works on these more complex aspects.
The main aim of the book is to introduce undergraduates and other stu-
dents new to ancient philosophy to the commentators of Plato and Aristotle. A 
secondary aim is to assess the work of those commentators as philosophers in 
their own right. This secondary aim can also be said to be the argument of the 
book. If newness is a virtue to be strived for in a scholarly work, the newness 
of The Ancient Commentators is to be found in its discussion of the commentators 
as philosophers. 
Presentation and Appearance
The presentational side of the book is limited by the budget set by the 
publishers. No Greek font has been allowed and the classy and stylish sensibil-
ity of the authorship is not matched in the physical appearance. The absence of 
the Greek font may have been thought to be suitable for philosophy students 
with little or no Greek but it will certainly not satisfy scholars of the classi-
cal or post-classical world who are another main audience of The Ancient Com-
mentators. Additionally, one could argue that the use of non-Latin fonts can be 
integral to content. There is also a discrepancy between the relatively large size 
of the font used for the main text and the size of font for the auxiliary mate-
rial that is slightly uncomfortably small. Further, the margins in the main text 
are never sufficient, for reasons of economy of space, and this makes the book 
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feel crammed (physically, not intellectually). The famous ‘white space’ design-
ers of books fight for is absent. On the other hand, if this is the only way that a 
valuable book like this sees the light of day and if one has to accept the several 
shortcomings of its production, so be it. 
The author has worked very hard to preserve clarity of thought and style 
and this is also reflected in her auxiliary materials. She has provided a chronol-
ogy for the benefit of her readers and has drawn up careful lists of abbreviations 
and further reading. Her bibliography is sufficiently full for her purposes and 
her index works very well. The distinction between further reading and bibli-
ography is insightful, as students will turn to each at different stages of their 
acquaintance with their subject and at different stages in their modules.
An area where there is room for improvement is perhaps the table of con-
tents. This is a part of a book that is often underestimated but it can make a 
considerable difference to the way the reader (especially the undergraduate 
reader) is introduced to it. In addition, the very good Introduction of The An-
cient Commentators is more like an Introductory Chapter and maybe a separate 
Introduction preceding it would have served readers better in drawing them 
more gently into the rigorous philosophical training ahead of them. Finally, 
the title, the first thing one learns about a book, is slightly confusing. As said 
earlier, Plato, Aristotle, and their reception are not treated equally in the book 
and this is very difficult to express in a title that seeks to be snappy, trendy, and 
marketable. Still, whatever the reasons for it, the title does not fit the book like 
a glove. A more general limitation, inevitable due to the absence of a Greek 
font, is the lack of any excerpts in the original Greek. All quotations in the book 
had to be provided in translation only (often by other authors) but Tuominen 
has made the process seem seamless. Yet, a bilingual appendix at the end would 
have tailed things off nicely.
Conclusion
In conclusion, The Ancient Commentators is a well-researched and well-
written introduction produced with students and their lecturers in mind. It 
deserves the attention and patronage of both and it is hoped that it will grace 
the university libraries and departmental collections of many institutions. It de-
serves to be on reading lists of undergraduate and MA modules: its content and 
auxiliary materials are immensely helpful to the beginner and to the interme-
diate student of ancient philosophy. Tuominen’s passion for teaching definitely 
comes through in the book.

